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Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
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v. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jonas, 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990), is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. On June 19, 1990, Petitioner timely 
filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals. On June 27, 
1990, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing. A copy of that Court's order denying the Petition for 
Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on May 22, 
1990. After timely requesting and receiving an extension of time, 
Appellant filed his Petition for Rehearing on June 19, 1990. The 
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari must be filed. Rule 48(c), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
therefore timely filed pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978); Theft by 
Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(c) (1978); and Theft by 
Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge, presiding. After a trial held on April 20, 21, 22 and 25, 
1988, a jury convicted Mr. Jonas of the three counts and the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah rendered final judgment and 
conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State charged Mr. Jonas with seven counts of Theft by 
Receiving; following a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on three 
of those counts. 
The charges arose out of a number of incidents involving 
a police informant, Jim Prater, and an undercover agent, 
Sgt. Illsey. As the Court of Appeals set forth in its opinion at 
3-4, these incidents involved an undercover police officer selling 
various items to Mr. Jonas. The officer was large, with a 
distinctive appearance, and had arrested Mr. Jonas in the past. 
Mr. Jonas' defense to the charges was that he knew 
officers were setting him up in a "sting" operation, recognized 
Sgt. Illsey from the prior arrest, and therefore knew the items were 
not stolen. Mr. Jonas also involved a different officer, Officer 
Brown, by requesting that Officer Brown double check that the items 
were not stolen and to witness an incident where, according to 
Mr. Jonas, undercover agent Illsey was planning to sell drugs. 
The jury apparently was persuaded by Mr. Jonas' defense 
that he did not believe the items were stolen in assessing the four 
later counts and finding him not guilty on those counts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH 
MISAPPLIES THE FACTS, IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING 
CASE LAW. AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION 
RENDERED BY ANOTHER PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
In reaching its decision that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause, 
this Court determined that the jurors responses did not raise an 
inference of partiality or prejudice. State v. Jonas. 135 Utah Adv 
Rep. 38, 41-2 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990). The Court 
focused on the juror's statement that she might be "a little" 
influenced if the case involved tools and determined that 
This case did not involve tools, so it could be 
inferred that the prior experience did not 
influence her at all. 
Id. at 41. The Court's decision ignores the juror's later statement 
that it probably would be difficult for her to be impartial. Id. al 
40. It also ignores the obvious fact that both the crime in which 
the juror had been a victim and the crime before the Court in the 
instant case were theft related. It further fails to take into 
account her repeated expressions of concern that she would be biasec 
and her emotional response to police officers' failure to get the 
tools back. Id. at 40-1. 
In State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), this Court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse 
for cause two jurors who had been victims of a burglary. This Court 
stated: 
Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional 
response, there is posed a warning that the juror 
may not have a mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference to the party or cause before the 
court . . . [B]ased on the juror's expressed 
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court 
must determine by a process of logic and reason, 
based upon common experience, whether the juror 
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can stand in attitude of indifference between the 
state and the accused. 
Id. at 884. 
In State v. Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (1990), an 
opinion issued three days after the opinion in the instant case, a 
different panel in the Court of Appeals, comprised of Judges Orme, 
Davidson and Billings, reversed a criminal conviction and remanded 
the case for a new trial based on the trial judged failure to 
excuse for cause a juror who gave inconsistent responses to similar 
voir dire questions in two separate courtrooms. The defendant in 
Suarez filed an affidavit from the defense attorney in another case 
which indicated that the juror at issue had indicated in the other 
courtroom that he was biased in favor of police testimony. Relying 
on State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984), and State v. 
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980), a panel of the Court of 
Appeals determined that the juror should have been excused for 
cause. Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66. In Suarez, the juror 
indicated to the trial judge that he would not be biased in favor of 
police officers. The juror's answer on its face, therefore, showed 
no bias. The Court of Appeals, however, relied on an affidavit 
filed by the defense lawyer in the other case in which the juror had 
been questioned to reach its decision that the juror should have 
been excused for cause. 
Given the statements by the juror in the present case 
that it would probably be difficult for her to be fair and her 
emotional response to the theft, the result in Suarez should also 
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have also occurred in this case. 
This Court also determined that even if an inference wer 
raised, the juror's subsequent responses showed that her concern wa 
merely the product of a "light impression" and not one that would 
"close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in 
opposition [citation omitted]." On the contrary, her final 
statement acknowledged her emotional reaction to the incident. 
Furthermore, after numerous other statements which indicated an 
emotional reaction to the fact the police "didn't do anything" and 
that she still had not gotten her possessions back, and a repeated 
concern that she might be influenced by the incident, a single 
statement by the juror that she believed she could be impartial doei 
not "attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." See Jonas. 135 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (contained in Appendix A) for transcript of 
juror's voir dire response. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Jones. 734 
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), citing State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 88< 
(Utah 1981): 
When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of 
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or 
she can render an impartial verdict cannot 
attenuate the earlier expressions of bias. 
In this case, where the juror stated that she had been 
the victim of similar crime and indicated an emotional response to 
that prior incident, the trial judge abused his discretion in 
failing to excuse her for cause. Mr. Jonas respectfully requests 
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that this Court grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this 
issue. 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE 
FACTS AND EXISTING CASE LAW FROM THIS COURT IN 
DECIDING THAT THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE JURORS AND 
BAILIFF DID NOT RAISE A PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE. 
In the instant case, after both parties had rested but 
before instructions or closing arguments were presented to the jury, 
the bailiff had an unauthorized and inappropriate exchange with the 
jurors. The parties had rested on a Friday, and over the weekend, 
the pregnant sister of one of the jurors was shot during a highly 
publicized video store robbery. The bailiff told the jurors that 
Juror Davis' sister had been murdered in the video store robbery and 
that Juror Davis had been excused from the panel. (Transcript of 
July 6, 1989 at 3-4). The jurors were not aware of the information 
prior to the bailiff's discussion. 
During trial, Mr. Jonas made a Motion for Mistrial based 
on the unauthorized contact. (Transcript of April 25, 1988 at 5). 
Mr. Jonas argued that the contact raised a presumption of prejudice 
pursuant to State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that "the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors before the jury began 
deliberating was an incidental contact raising no presumption of 
prejudice." Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Jonas argued that the contact 
raised a presumption of prejudice under Pike. 
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Although there is disagreement as to the 
specifics of what the bailiff said to the jurors 
in this case ( . . • ) , the information which is 
included in the transcript establishes that the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was 
more than brief and incidental and went beyond 
mere civilties. At the very least, the bailiff 
informed the jurors of the reason that another 
juror had been excused. He made them aware that 
the juror's sister had been murdered in a highly 
publicized incident that had occurred over the 
weekend. 
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors 
of a reason for excusing another juror was outside 
his role as a bailiff and went beyond any 
permissible contact that might be allowed as part 
of his duties in shepherding the jury. The 
statement tended to heighten the jurors7 awareness 
of crime in the community and would give rise to 
all of the reactions, fears and concerns that 
people feel when considering society's current 
level of criminal activity. The nature of the 
information was far more intense and of a more 
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a 
conversation about a bunged toe or a witness' 
job. In addition, any follow-up commentary by the 
jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific 
incident or crime in general, none of which was 
recorded but which it is reasonable to assume 
occurred, could have a significant prejudicial 
impart on a criminal defendant whose case was 
currently being tried. 
Information to the jurors regarding the 
reason for excusing Mr. Davis should have been 
carefully controlled. Instead, the bailiff 
imparted the information in a completely 
uncontrolled situation where Mr. Jonas and his 
attorney had no opportunity to hear what was said 
and no opportunity to have input or comment on the 
information or to object to it being conveyed. 
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as 
an extension of the court and because his position 
is that of a court official, his statements carry 
great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 
[363 (1966)] at 365. Furthermore, he has a 
responsibility to monitor and control his actions 
and statements while in the presence of the jury 
so as to not taint them. Since the bailiff's 
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contact with the jury as a whole went beyond one 
of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice was raised by his 
unauthorized comments. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 27-8. This argument is based on the 
facts and circumstances of the instant case and is not merely an 
assumption that the presumption was raised. 
The State agreed in this case that the presumption was 
raised, stating: 
Despite being a brief and a natural outgrowth of 
the relationship between bailiff and jury, it is 
reasonable to classify the encounter as one in 
which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice would 
rise. 
State's Brief at 45. 
Both of the reasons for the rule, as articulated in Pike, 
712 P.2d at 279-80 (Utah 1980), are applicable to this situation 
where the bailiff had unauthorized contact with jurors. First, it 
is inherently difficult to prove the effect of the contact on the 
juror, and second, the appearance of impropriety causes a 
deleterious effect upon the judicial process. Because the bailiff 
is an extension of the court and wears an emblem of authority, he 
has a greater potential for impact on a juror than many witnesses. 
The Court of Appeals states that "[t]here was no exchange 
at all because the jurors said nothing." Jonas. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 43. The facts in this case do not support such a statement; the 
bailiff was not asked and did not volunteer information regarding 
the statements or physical reactions made in response to the 
information. Mr. Jonas contends that the State had the burden of 
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establishing lack of prejudice once the presumption arose; the Stat 
failed to establish that the jurors said or did nothing in response 
and this Court erroneously determined that no such exchange occurre 
Although the truth of the bailiff's statement is not at 
issue, its impact on the jurors is. If jurors were discussing high 
crime rates or emotional reactions to crime with the bailiff, or 
even among themselves, in response to the bailiff's information, 
they were impacted by the information. 
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant hi: 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue and determine that thi 
Court of Appeals erroneously decided that a presumption of prejudic< 
was raised in this case and that the State failed to rebut that 
presumption. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant his 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and review the issues addressed 
herein. 
SUBMITTED thisC* / day of July, 1990. 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
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J$AN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
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APPENDIX A 
„ Charlesworth v. i 
£2 UliittlL 
ered on appeal. See Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. 
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 
(Utah 1988). The ationale advanced in the dissenting 
opinion concerning lack of full inquiry concerning 
the children's circumstances and appropriateness of 
the visitation order, would have equal application in 
a separate URESA action, but because of the 
limited jurisdiction under that act, would clearly be 
irrelevant. 
3. See Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), 
where the supreme court held that child support 
payment could not be conditioned upon the noncu-
stodial parent's obtaining visitation. See also 
McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (per curiam). 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
I take no serious issue with the majority's 
view of the law generally applicable to cases 
brought under URESA. And I would take no 
issue with the result my colleagues reach if an 
independent URESA action had been comm-
enced simply to recover sums paid by Califo-
rnia for the support of the subject children. 
This is not such a case, however, and accor-
dingly I do not join my colleagues in reversing 
the trial court's disposition, which I believe 
was appropriate under the circumstances. 
First, it is important to emphasize that relief 
was not sought in an independent action. On 
the contrary, a petition bearing the caption 
and case number of the underlying divorce 
action was filed in that case on behalf of 
defendant Blanca Charlesworth. The petition 
purported to show California as an additional 
defendant although leave of court was neither 
requested nor obtained to add an additional 
defendant to the underlying action. Accordi-
ngly, while California no doubt had a claim 
on any recovery that might be obtained and 
clearly was the impetus behind the effort to 
collect support, the only defendant properly 
before the court was defendant Blanca Char-
lesworth. 
Not only did California seek enforcement of 
a support obligation in a pending divorce 
action over which the court had continuing 
jurisdiction as a matter of statutory law, see 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3)0989), but in 
addition it chose to pursue the matter in the 
context of a case where the court's prior 
decree had expressly ''held in abeyance until 
the further order of the Court" the issue of 
child support. This provision seems to have 
been prompted by defendant's inappropriate 
action in concealing her whereabouts and that 
of the children, as a result of which no mea-
ningful evidence could be obtained about the 
children's circumstances and Blanca's ability 
t o contribute to their support. In addition to 
being unable to intelligently set a level of 
support payments to be made by plaintiff, the 
court no doubt hoped that the lack of support 
payments from plaintiff might smoke Blanca 
out,, require her to come forward, and permit 
the court to have access to the information 
ate of California CODE«CO 
Y. Rep. 36 Pr<m>.ut«h 
necessary to determine an appropriate level of 
support. 
The trial court remains thwarted in its effort 
to receive meaningful evidence relative to the 
children's circumstances and necessary to its 
determination of an appropriate level of per-
manent child support to be paid by plaintiffs 
It remains thwarted in its ability to enforce the 
"reasonable visitation" it also decreed in favor 
of plaintiff. At least in the context of the 
divorce action over which the court has cont-
inuing jurisdiction-and this is the context 
in which California chose to raise the issue— 
I think the court has the power and discretion 
to balance the parties' respective legal oblig-
ations in the way it did: Plaintiff has a legal 
duty to pay towards the support of his chil-
dren; defendant has the legal duty to make the 
children available for reasonable visitation. 
Moreover, the court is entitled to consider 
evidence about the children's circumstances so 
it can get the question of child support out of 
"abeyance" and fix as part of its divorce 
decree an appropriate amount for plaintiffs 
discharge of his ongoing support obligation. 
An order directing defendant to make minimal 
support payments to be held by the clerk, with 
disbursement to follow when the children are 
found, best accomplishes these purposes. 
California sought to enforce a support 
obligation which had advisedly been held in 
abeyance. It sought to do so in the context of 
a divorce action over which the court has 
continuing jurisdiction as to a wide range of 
issues. Whatever might have been appropriate 
in the context of an independent URESA 
action, the order entered by the court in this 
divorce proceeding was appropriate and I 
would affirm it. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
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R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and 
Larson.1 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding 
him guilty of three counts of theft: (1) theft by 
receiving, a third-degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (Supp. 
1989) and §76-6-412(b) (1978), on July 17, 
1985, and (2) on July 30, 1985, and (3) theft 
by receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in viol-
ation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 
(Supp; 1989) and §76-6-412(c) (1978), on 
July 25,1985. We affirm. 
Defendant seeks reversal of the convictions 
or a new trial on five grounds: (1) insufficient 
evidence; (2) failure to excuse a prospective 
juror for cause; (3) a bailiffs allegedly impr-
oper contact with jurors; (4) failure of the 
court reporter to provide an accurate transc-
ript of the evidentiary hearing on a motion for 
mistrial; and (5) denial of a motion to recuse 
the trial judge. We will review each of defen-
dant's challenges in turn. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
The standard of review of a jury verdict 
challenge based on insufficiency of the evid-
ence is as follows: 
[W]e view the evidence presented 
and all inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the verdict. Where there is 
any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from 
it, from which findings of all the 
elements of the crime can be made 
beyond a reasonable doubt, our 
inquiry is complete and we will 
sustain the verdict. 
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 
(1989) (citations omitted). Stated another way, 
we will reverse a jury conviction for insuffic-
ient evidence only when the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inhe-
rently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted.'" State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 
1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting Stare v. 
Markham, 750 P.2d 599,601 (Utah 1988)). 
In August 1986, defendant was charged with 
seven counts of theft by receiving arising out 
of separate transactions in 1985 and 1986. 
Four of the transactions occurred in July 
1985. There were no transactions between July 
30, 1985, and March 4, 1986. The three 1986 
transactions took place in March, April, and 
39 
May. 
There was no essential difference in the 
State's evidence regarding each of the seven 
transactions. The' police conducted a sting 
operation. On each occasion charged, an 
undercover police officer sold, and defendant 
purchased, various merchandise, consisting 
principally of equipment and appliances that 
the police had purchased beforehand or that 
was unclaimed evidence in police custody.2 In 
each instance, the officer posed as a thief or 
fence selling stolen goods for about ten cents 
on the dollar. He usually wore an audio rec-
order and some transactions were videoreco-
rded. These recordings were played and sub-
mitted to the jury. The police documented the 
goods sold and the monies defendant paid. 
Defendant does not dispute the State's 
evidence. Instead, he claims that he knew the 
property, he received in July 1985 was not 
stolen. Thus, he asserts that he did not have 
the culpable mental state that is a necessary 
element of the crime charged. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1989) provides, 
with our emphasis: 
A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it 
has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding 
any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
Defendant testified that he recognized as a 
police officer the undercover agent who sold 
him the merchandise in July 1985. Defendant 
also testified that he knew before all of the 
transactions that the property was not stolen. 
He claimed that this knowledge was based on 
information provided to him by two persons, 
James Lawrence Prater, a confidential police 
informant, and defendant's acquaintance, 
Officer Brown. Defendant and his wife testi-
fied that Prater told them in July 1985 about 
the sting operation but said "not to worry 
about it, that the merchandise was not 
stolen." Prater had arranged the first meeting 
between defendant and the undercover officer. 
Prater was not available at trial to corroborate 
or rebut the conversation testimony. On the 
other hand, Officer Brown did testify. Brown 
stated that in the fall of 1985, after the July 
transactions, defendant told him that he had 
been introduced by Prater to a man who had 
some damaged warehouse property that he 
would sell cheap to defendant. Defendant told 
Brown he thought Prater might be an under-
cover officer or an informant. Defendant's 
next contact with Brown was on March 29, 
1986, when he directed Brown to an anticip-
ated drug transaction which did not materia-
,Jonas 
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lize. In May or June 1986, defendant spoke to 
Brown again. He showed Brown some prop-
erty and asked Brown to check the national 
computer system, NCIC, to see if it was 
stolen. Brown remembered seeing an air 
compressor, saw blades, and a television. 
Defendant also gave Brown some serial 
numbers to check out. Brown reported to 
defendant that those items were not stolen. 
Brown believed that the checking on NCIC 
was done before defendant's arrest on August 
1> 1986. But police records indicated only one 
NCIC check by Brown, on August 14,1986. 
Defendant was convicted on the 1985 
charges and acquitted on the 1986 charges. 
The jury could have chosen to disbelieve def-
endant's story about the 1985 Prater conver-
sation, his recognition of the property seller as 
a police officer, and his knowledge about the 
status of the property at the time he received it 
in July 1985, even if they accepted defen-
dant's and Brown's testimony regarding def-
endant's knowledge or belief regarding the 
unstolen status of the property he received in 
1986. The jury, not the appellate court, perf-
orms the function of determining the credibi-
lity of a witness's testimony. State v. Lactod, 
761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A 
person may be convicted of theft by receiving 
even if the property is not in fact stolen pro-
perty, State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173 
(Utah 1985), if the State proves that the def-
endant acted under the belief that the property 
was stolen. Id, at 1172. Unless evidence that 
supports the jury's verdict is so insubstantial 
that the jury must necessarily have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the crime charged, we are obligated to 
assume the jury believed the evidence which 
supports the verdict. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 884 (Utah 1981). Nor will we overturn a 
conviction merely because the jury chose not 
to believe the defendant. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 
27. There is substantial evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably conclude that defe-
ndant, at the time of the July 1985 transact-
ions, believed that the property was stolen, 
despite his self-serving assertion at trial that 
he believed otherwise in July 1985. We there-
fore reject defendant's challenge to the jury's 
verdict. 
JURY SELECTION 
'After the completion of jury voir dire, 
defendant challenged one member of the 
venire for cause. Defense counsel, in an unr-
eported conference at the bench, excepted to 
the trial court's denial of that request. The 
next day, defense counsel entered his exception 
upon the record in the following form: 
MR, YENGICH: ... I failed-the 
Court allowed me to take exception 
to the Court's failure to -
THE COURT: Make a record. 
MR. YENGICH: -exclude Juror 
Number-prospective Juror No. 6. 
She is the lady that indicated she 
had been burglarized in the past 
and initially said— 
THE COURT: Ten or twenty years 
before, wasn't it? 
MR. YENGICH: Well, I don't 
know. The record will speak to 
that. She indicated initially an ind-
ication that she did not think she 
could be fair and impartial and I at 
the ben(ch] excepted to her as ind-
icating an implied bias of that par-
ticular juror and I used a peremp-
tory challenge to strike her. 
THE COURT: The record may so 
show.3 
Defendant's exception was based on the 
following voir dire colloquy between the trial 
court and juror Smith: 
THE COURT: All right. I almost 
hate to ask this question, but I'm 
obligated to. Have any of you been 
the victims of a theft? And that, as 
I've indicated to you before what a 
theft really is, taking property of 
another with intent to permanently 
deprive them, or in receiving. Well, 
we'll take that first. I saw some 
hands go up in the jury box. 
All right. Mrs. Smith? I assume all 
you women are married unless you 
tell me otherwise. 
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D. 
SMITH: Yes, my husband had 
about $13,000 worth of tools stolen 
about a year and a half ago which 
we have never— 
THE COURT: Did a criminal act 
result from that-or action? 
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D. 
SMITH: No, it was reported to the 
police, which they didn't do anyt-
hing about, and we still have never 
gotten-
THE COURT: They didn't find it? 
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D. 
SMITH: (shook head from side to 
side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was 
that? 
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D. 
SMITH: About a year and a half 
ago. 
THE COURT: Keeping that inci-
dent in mind, as I indicated, there 
are different parties involved, but 
sometimes based on our experience 
we allow that to interfere with our 
thinking. 
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D. 
SMITH: It might be. If it was 
tools, I might be a little influenced. 
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THE COURT: Weil, wait just a 
minute. Let me ask the questions 
and you just answer the question. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: All right. 
THE COURT: Bearing that in 
mind, do you believe that that inc-
ident would make it difficult for 
you to be fair and impartial, parti-
cularly to this Defendant, as well as 
the people of the state of Utah? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: It's a little hard to say. 
THE COURT: Well, you just take 
time to think it over because we— 
you're the one that-
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: It probably would, yes. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're 
Mrs.~ 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe 
that you could set those facts aside 
and make a determination on the 
evidence that's presented in this 
case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: I-well, yes, I believe I 
could be impartial. 
THE COURT: We know you 
didn't like to lose the tools. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. 
SMITH: No, I didn't. 
Defendant's objection to prospective juror 
Smith is based on Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18(e)(14) (codified at Utah Code 
Ann. §77-35-18(e)(14) (1982), repealed 
effective July 1,1990), which provides: 
The challenge for cause is an obje-
ction to a particular juror and may 
be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either party, 
which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging.... 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial 
judge committed reversible error by rejecting 
his challenge of Smith for cause. In his brief, 
he summarizes this claim of error as follows: 
The trial judge abused his discretion 
in failing to excuse Juror Smith for 
cause after she indicated that she 
had been a victim of a crime similar 
to the crime charged and that she 
believed such experience would 
interfere with her ability to be 
impartial. 
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for 
cause is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 
459, 462 (Utah 1989). When reviewing such a 
ruling, we reverse* only if the trial court has 
abused that discretion by committing harmful 
error. Id. The general rule concerning abuse of 
discretion is that the appellate court "will 
presume that the discretion of the trial court 
was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984); 
see State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 
1985). An appellant has the burden of establ-
ishing that reversible error resulted from an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439,448 (Utah 1988). 
'A court commits prejudicial error if it 
forces a party to exercise a peremptory chall-
enge to remove a prospective juror who should 
have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 
P.2d at 461; State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123, 
1125 (Utah 1989); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. 
When comments are made by a juror which 
facially bring into question that prospective 
juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion may occur unless the court or 
counsel investigates further and finds the inf-
erence rebutted or dismisses the juror. See 
Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127. 
The Cobb holding suggests a two-part 
procedure. When the threshold of apparent 
partiality or prejudice is crossed and an infe-
rence arises, the court must determine from 
further inquiry of the venire member whether 
the inference is rebutted. Thus, our first que-
stion is: Did Smith's initial comments raise an 
inference of partiality and prejudice on her 
part as to this cause or this defendant? We 
think not. She stated that the prior theft of 
her husband's tools might influence her thin-
king a little, if this case involved tools. This 
case did not involve tools, so it could be inf-
erred that the prior experience would not inf-
luence her at all. As the trial court pressed her 
further, she expressed some concern while 
weighing her feelings about her ability to be 
fair but, upon final weighing, she expressed 
affirmative belief in her impartiality. Juror 
Smith's mild initial responses are in stark 
contrast to those of the two prospective jurors 
in Stare v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), 
who crossed the Cobb threshold. They stated 
that their strong adverse emotional responses 
as former crime victims would affect their 
thinking; Smith did not. They identified a 
residue of personal trauma which would 
compromise their capacity for objectivity; 
Smith did not. Their expressed states of mind 
supported an inference that they could not act 
with impartiality, defined as "a mental attitude 
of appropriate indifference" in Srate v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977), while 
Smith's expressed state of mind did not 
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Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that 
Smith's initial comments raised on their face a 
threshold inference of partiality and prejudice, 
her subsequent responses to the judge's que-
stioning show her concern was merely the 
product of a "light impression" and not one 
that'would "close the mind against the testi-
mony that might be offered in opposition." 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v. 
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,768 (Utah 1980)). 
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
grant defendant's request for removal of 
Smith from the jury panel for cause. 
BAILIFF CONTACT 
The parties rested their presentations on 
Friday, April 22, 1988, after four days of 
trial. The trial court then scheduled jury inst-
ruction and closing arguments for Monday 
morning, April 25. That weekend, a sister of 
juror Davis was shot to death during a 
robbery of a local video store. Juror Davis 
informed the court on Monday morning that 
he could not continue as a juror due to the 
fact that his pregnant sister had been murd-
ered. Upon stipulation of counsel, the court 
excused Davis from further jury duty and an 
alternate juror moved into Davis's place on 
the jury. Davis, upon his departure from the 
courthouse, asked the bailiff to explain his 
absence to the other jurors, and the bailiff 
then did so. 
Defense counsel, upon learning of the 
bailiffs contact with the jury, moved for a 
mistrial because the bailiff "did inform them 
of that." The court denied the motion without 
prejudice. Later, the bailiff was placed under 
oath and testified as follows about his contact 
with the jury: 
(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed 
Bailiff HUGH BELL under oath, 
who testified as follows:) 
THE COURT: State your name. 
THE WITNESS: Hugh Bell. 
THE COURT: And you are 
Deputy Sheriff? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Bailiff of this 
court? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: This morning at 
nine o'clock Mr. Davis came in and 
stated reasons to the Court why he 
would like to be excused from the 
case, and would you tell us the 
sequence of events that happened 
after he left the chambers? 
THE WITNESS: He came into 
the courtroom and asked for state-
ment of service on his jury duty and 
I went to Joan, found where the 
statement was, got her to fill one 
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out for him, gave it to him. I 
walked to the door and expressed 
my sympathy to him and everyt-
hing, and he asked me if I would 
tell the rest of the jurors what 
happened, why he was excused. 
THE COURT: And what did you 
do? 
THE WITNESS: I went in and I 
told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't 
be in because his sister was the lady 
that was shot out in West Valley. 
THE COURT: Were they discu-
ssing the case or the incident at all 
when you went in? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Did you ever hear 
them discuss it? 
THE WITNESS: They didn't 
know a thing about it. 
THE COURT: All right, you may 
cross-examine. 
MR. YENGICH: No cross-
examination. 
Defense counsel immediately renewed his 
mistrial motion "on the basis of the record."4 
Again, his motion was denied. 
On appeal, defendant argues that, "by inf-
orming the remaining jurors that the trial 
court had excused another juror and the 
reason for that excuse, the bailiff interfered 
with Mr. Jonas' right to a trial by an impar-
tial jury," guaranteed by the sixth amendment 
to the United States Constitution.5 He relies 
on the declaration in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277, 279-80 (Utah 1985), that "[anything 
more than the most incidental contact during 
the trial between witnesses and jurors casts 
doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at 
best gives the appearance of the absence of 
impartiality." In Pike, an important prosecu-
tion witness (an arresting officer and eyewit-
ness) engaged three jurors in conversation 
about a personal incident. The Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice from the juror-witness contact 
was established because "the conversation 
amounted to more than a brief, incidental 
contact and no doubt had the effect of bree-
ding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the juror's judgment as to [the 
witness's] credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281. 
Once such a presumption is raised, the court 
reaffirmed, the burden is on the prosecution 
to prove that the unauthorized contact did not 
influence the juror.* Id. at 280; see State v. 
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988). 
Pike identifies two reasons for the rule that 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises 
from a nonincidental witness contact with a 
juror: (1) the inherent difficulty in proving 
how or whether a juror has in fact been infl-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE • co State v. 
Prtno.VtMh l35Utah A 
court pointed out that, "while in a sense the 
juror's conversation with the trial judge was 
on a subject connected with the trial," the 
judge's response was not. Garcia, 355 P.2d at 
59. Although it would have been improper for 
the judge to discuss the issue with the juror, 
the court stated, the judge's actual response 
was proper. Id. The court saw "nothing about 
this situation which would tend to prejudice 
the defendant," distinguishing cases in which 
prejudice was presumed from a contact 
between a juror and a witness or interested 
party during the deliberative process. Id. 
Here, the bailiffs message to the jury had 
an even more tenuous connection to the 
subject of the trial itself than the verbal inte-
rchange in Garcia. Although it was not unin-
tended, it was not the kind of communication 
which would prejudice the jury's judgment 
regarding their verdict in this case. 
The second reason identified in Pike for 
presuming prejudice is also absent here. Juror-
prosecution witness contacts make the entire 
judicial process look collusive or unfair to the 
defendant. However, unlike verbal contacts 
between jurors and trial participants, verbal 
contacts beyond mere civilities between jurors 
and a bailiff, about subjects other than those 
connected with the trial at hand, are expected 
and unavoidable since the bailiff is assigned to 
minister to the jurors' needs and to be the 
contact person. We do not believe that Pike 
compels the conclusion that prejudice presu-
mptively results when a bailiff says anything 
other than "Hello" or "Good morning" to a 
juror at a time when the case has not even 
been submitted to the jury for deliberations. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. §77-17-9 (1990) 
(officer in charge of sequestered jury must not 
speak with jury "on any subject connected 
with the trial") with Utah Code Ann. §77-
17-11 (1990) (officer in charge of jury in 
deliberations shall "not permit any person to 
speak to or communicate with them or to do 
so himself except upon the order of the court 
. . . ."); see Still v. State, 484 P.2d 549 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1971) (unauthorized communica-
tion between bailiff and jury during its delib-
erations would raise presumption of preju-
dice). 
This bailiff did not mingle with the jurors 
or converse with them about the trial itself; 
nor did he interrupt their deliberations. His 
brief contact concerning something tangential 
to the trial itself did not give rise to any app-
earance of impropriety. Thus, the trial court 
could have properly concluded that the contact 
was incidental and raised no presumption of 
prejudice. 
Because we conclude that the juror-bailiff 
contact did not deny defendant his constitut-
ional right to an impartial jury, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
request for a mistrial. See State v. Spcer, 750 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1988). 
CE REPORTS 
uenced by conversing with a participant in the 
trial, and (2) the deleterious effect upon the 
judicial process because of the appearance of 
impropriety from such contact. Pike, 712 P.2d 
at 280. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not 
indicate whether the denial of defendant's 
motion was based on a determination that the 
contact was incidental or that the contact was 
nonincidental, but the resulting presumption 
of prejudice was rebutted. On appeal, defen-
dant assumes that the contact between the 
bailiff and the jurors was presumptively prej-
udicial because it was more than "a brief, 
incidental contact where only remarks of civ-
ility were exchanged." Erickson, 749 P.2d at 
620. 
In light of the enunciated reasons for the 
rule reaffirmed in Pike, we conclude that the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors 
before the jury began deliberating was an 
incidental contact raising no presumption of 
prejudice. Erickson and Pike and all the other 
Utah cases cited by defendant involved conv-
ersational contacts between a juror and a trial 
witness. In such circumstances, it is appropr-
iate to characterize any verbal contact beyond 
mere civilities as nonincidental because it 
might influence the juror's ability to assess 
impartially the credibility of that witness. 
Jurors should not, as a matter of course, talk 
to witnesses about the case at hand or about 
anything else. According to Pike, the subst-
ance of any such conversation does not dictate 
application of the presumptive prejudice rule. 
The rule is applied, first, because of the pot-
ential for the conversation's subtle effect on 
the juror's ability to assess the credibility of 
the trial participant with whom he has conv-
ersed. Here, however, unlike the juror-
witness cases relied upon by defendant, no 
"conversation" took place, in the normal sense 
of an "oral exchange of sentiments, observa-
tions, opinions, [or] ideas." Webster's Third 
Int'l Dictionary 458 (1986). There was no 
exchange at all because the jurors said 
nothing. The bailiff merely conveyed inform-
ation about why juror Davis would not be 
present for the balance of the trial. In addi-
tion, the bailiffs credibility in the eyes of the 
jury was not at issue. He did not testify. The 
truth of his statement to the jury was not 
relevant. 
We think the facts in this case are more like 
those in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 
P.2d 57 (1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 970 
(1961). In Garcia, the contact occurred at the 
same stage of the proceedings, i.e., after all 
the evidence was in, but before the jury was 
instructed or the case argued or submitted. A 
juror approached the trial judge and privately 
asked if the parties would introduce tapes of 
certain testimony. The judge responded that 
he did not know, but would advise counsel 
that the juror had inquired. Our supreme 
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MOTION HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Defendant claims that his right of appeal 
has been impermissibly impaired because the 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing on his 
mistrial motion is incomplete. Defense counsel 
agrees that the bailiffs contact with the jury, 
discussed above, was a basis for the initial 
mistrial motion,7 which was denied without 
prejudice. A hearing was later held concerning 
the bailiff-jury contact, at which the only 
witness called to testify was the bailiff. His 
testimony, fully quoted above, was short and 
direct and comported with defense counsel's 
report of the jury contact when stated as the 
ground for the initial motion. The bailiffs 
testimony concerning the content of his 
message to the jury did not give rise to a 
presumption of prejudice. Thus, the inquiry 
ended, and when defense counsel renewed the 
mistrial motion at the close of the testimony, 
it was again denied. The transcript of the 
court's inquiry, the bailiff's testimony, 
counsel's motion, and the court's ruling is 
complete. That portion of the transcript has 
no gaps and no indications of unintelligible 
words. The indication "(illegible)" appears 
solely in connection with statements of the 
court and counsel, which do not form the 
basis for defendant's claim that the jury was 
not impartial. Defense counsel's mistrial 
motion was renewed on the "basis of the 
record/ i.e., the bailiffs testimony. 
The court reporters' transcripts are virtually 
complete and thus amply adequate for us to 
review defendant's claims. This transcript is 
not like the transcript in Stare v. Taylor, 664 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), where a new trial was 
ordered. There, a juror's responses to voir 
dire questions were totally absent from the 
record and could not be reconstructed. Here, 
the bailiffs testimony was totally reported, 
and there was no need to reconstruct the 
record.1 We find the transcript before us to be 
functionally adequate for review. Not all 
deficiencies or inaccuracies in the record 
require a new trial. State v. Perry, 401 
N.W^d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987). We conclude 
that the condition of the transcripts did not 
deprive defendant of due process or of the 
right of appeal guaranteed by Article 1, section 
12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code 
Ann. §77-l-6(l)(g) (1990).' 
TRIAL JUDGE RECUSAL 
Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice 
against Judge Banks, pursuant to Rule 29 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He 
alleged that, twenty years earlier, the judge, as 
prosecutor, had been forced to dismiss certain 
criminal charges against him. Defendant 
claimed -the judge still harbored resentment 
towards him arising from the dismissal. Def-
endant asserted actual bias of the judge 
against him, arising from that incident and 
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from several other criminal prosecutions of 
defendant while Judge Banks was prosecuting 
attorney. 
The trial judge examined the matter consi-
stent with the rule, Utah R. Crim. P. 29, and 
statutory procedure, Utah Code Ann. §77-
35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July 
1, 1990). The court compared defendant's 
factual allegations with the court files in each 
prior case. The court records demonstrated 
defendant's affidavit to be factually inaccu-
rate concerning the judge's direct involvement 
in the several prosecutions, with one excep-
tion. The judge found that he had been pers-
onally involved in only one of defendant's 
prior prosecutions. Regarding that case, Judge 
Banks stated: 
[A] minute entry [is] endorsed on 
the Information showing that it was 
my motion to dismiss, and the 
others, the only basis for any prej-
I udice would be that I was the Dis-
1 trict Attorney and that people who 
appeared in behalf of the State at 
the District Attorney's level were 
my deputies. 
The judge concluded that the defendant's 
affidavit was factually insufficient and that 
prejudice was not shown. The matter was 
referred to another trial judge for review 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d). That 
judge denied defendant's motion to disqualify 
Judge Banks and referred the case back to him 
for trial. 
Defendant has failed to show any actual 
bias requiring recusal. We consider State v. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied, 
108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), to be controlling. In 
Neeley, Judge Banks, as prosecutor, had 
signed some criminal informations against 
defendants and had appeared in court in one 
case to accept a guilty plea. Based on those 
facts, the court found no actual bias, as req-
uired, and no grounds for reversal. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Judge Banks determined that he 
had no actual bias against defen-
dant Belt by reason of his involve-
ment in Belt's prosecution some 
twenty years prior. He then foll-
owed the statutorily mandated 
procedure to determine whether 
sufficient legal grounds existed to 
require his disqualification. While it 
has been suggested that a trial judge 
disqualify himself whenever an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice is 
filed against him in good faith, this 
practice is not mandatory. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. Continuing, th« 
Court stated: 
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But, while we recommend the pra-
ctice that a judge recuse himself 
where there is a colorable claim of 
bias or prejudice, absent a showing 
of actual bias or an abuse of disc-
retion, failure to do so does not 
constitute reversible error as long as 
the requirements of section 77-35-
29 [Utah R. Crim. P. 29] are met. 
Id. 
In light of defendant's failure to establish 
actual bias or an abuse of discretion, Judge 
Banks did not commit reversible error by 
refusing to disqualify himself as trial judge. 
We affirm defendant's convictions. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
John Farr Larson, Judge 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. The merchandise purchased in the seven transac-
tions was, respectively, (1) Fischer VCR and 
Samsung TV, (2) Toshiba TV, (3) RCA and Magn-
avox video recorders, (4) three microwave ovens, (5) 
chain saw, (6) grill, air compressor, and kerosene 
lantern, and (7) Fischer VCR. 
3. Although defense counsel spoke of "implied 
bias/ the record indicates that the court and opp-
osing counsel understood that the legal basis of the 
challenge to prospective juror Smith for cause was 
"actual bias/ Subsections (e)(1) through (e)(13) of 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 state grounds of implied bias 
or bias at law, i.e., bias arising from status. Subse-
ction (e)(14) sets forth actual bias, i.e., bias arising 
from state of mind, as a ground for a challenge for 
cause. 
4. See note 7, infra. 
5. Although defendant mentions Article I, sections 
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution in his appellate 
brief, this issue was neither raised below nor adeq-
uately briefed or argued on appeal. We therefore 
confine our analysis to the federal constitution. See 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 51 n.4 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
6. This rule has its Utah roots in Stare v. Thome, 39 
Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911), in which two officers 
took the jury to lunch at a public hotel in the midst 
of their deliberations. One juror and one officer left 
the group and the juror talked to someone on the 
telephone. The record did not show whom the juror 
talked with or what was said. The court concluded: 
From the conduct disclosed and the 
exposure of the juror to harmful influ-
ences, prejudice is presumed, and the 
burden cast on the state to show what 
the communication was, and that it was 
harmless and could not have influenced 
or affected the deliberations of the juror 
or his verdict, 
/d., 117 P. at 66. 
7. Defendant's trial counsel filed an affidavit stating 
that he "thinks" he might have had a second ground 
for the renewed mistrial motion. If so, that ground 
would appear in the transcript of the proceedings. 
Appellate counsel has not identified a seco 
ground for our consideration. Trial counsel's al 
davit speculates that the purported second grou 
might have related to the prosecutor's closing ai 
ument. But the transcript of closing arguments 
complete, without gaps, and without indication 
an unintelligible word. Thus, any problem wi 
argument could be identified by appellate couns< 
Again, none has been directed to our attentio 
Moreover, the transcript reveals that defense couns 
did not interpose any objection during the course > 
the prosecutor's argument. Counsel has the unfei 
ered opportunity to interrupt at any time at 
request that any portion of an argument be rec< 
rded, and to voice any objection thereto he ma 
desire. State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 921 (Uta 
1979). We conclude that the only actual ground fc 
the renewed mistrial motion was the bailiff 
conduct. 
8. Here, the trial court attempted to "settle th 
record" due to defendant's claims about omissions 
However, those omissions were not related to th 
material issues of this appeal as discussed in ou 
analysis. 
9. Defendant received, at State expense, a full an< 
complete transcript of his trial consisting of severa 
volumes. He takes no issue with the adequacy of th< 
transcripts except a portion of one volume tha 
contains instructions to the jury, closing arguments 
and the hearing on the mistrial motion. The coun 
reporter for these proceedings on the final day ol 
trial departed the state and could not be located tc 
prepare that part of the transcript. The reporter ai 
all other trial proceedings prepared the entire tran-
script, utilizing the written notes of the missing 
reporter. 
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UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
F I LED 
JUNPJnaon 
v?'/"< of r-tCojrt 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Galen L. Jonas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 880411-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 19, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this day of June, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Mary T^/Nqonan, Clerk 
•v-
